Designing Debt Restructuring: The Adverse Effects on Labor Market Outcomes
Best PhD Paper Award at CEPR Conference on Household Finance; Ola Bengtsson Award for the best Finance PhD paper
Abstract: This paper examines how the design of debt restructuring or personal insolvency programs shapes labor market outcomes using Sweden as a case study. In the Swedish debt restructuring program, debt is forgiven following a 5-year partial repayment period. I estimate the causal effects of the program using an examiner instrumental variable (IV) design and show that traditional examiner IV estimates can be biased if there is path dependency in examiner decision-making. This bias is avoided by estimating examiner leniency from past cases. On average, participation in the debt restructuring program has negative effects on labor income and employment, but these findings mask a large heterogeneity. Initially employed participants experience relative gains in income and employment, while initially unemployed participants face substantial negative effects. Both of these effects persist even after the program has ended. Combining observational data and results from a survey I conducted among debt restructuring participants, I show that the risk of substantial increases in repayment obligations disincentivizes unemployed participants from seeking employment. I then calibrate a labor supply model and show that modest changes in the repayment plan structure improve welfare for both debtors and creditors. These findings challenge the practice of substantially adjusting repayment plans in debt restructuring programs in response to income changes.
Abstract: We study the effects of corporate acquisitions on workers using Swedish administrative data and document substantial, persistent earnings losses following acquisitions. These losses reflect both displacement and wage cuts among stayers from target firms. We find no evidence that increased monopsony power accounts for these wage cuts. Instead, they are concentrated in acquisitions where the acquiring-firm CEO sat on the board of the target prior to the transaction. Such acquisitions increase acquiring-firm profits and CEO pay, without affecting total employment or revenue, consistent with rent redistribution. Overall, acquisitions reduce wages and disrupt employment, with profit gains partly extracted from workers.
Abstract: Many part-time workers report a preference for increasing their working hours at the current wage rate. This paper analyzes the role that firm labor market power plays in shaping this involuntary part-time employment in Sweden. We use a novel identification strategy based on part-time workers who experience an increase in local labor market concentration caused by a large layoff event at another firm within the same labor market. We compare these workers to unaffected colleagues in different occupations within the same plant. Our findings reveal that increased labor market concentration substantially reduces wages and working hours. At the same time their employers increase employment on the extensive margin. To explain these findings, we present evidence that, unlike full-time workers, part-time workers' productivity falls in weekly working hours. Thus, employers face incentives to increase production by expanding employment on the extensive margin, rather than by raising hours of part-time workers. These findings suggest that firm labor market power contributes to involuntary part-time employment.
Tertiary Education and Innovation (with David Seim and David Strömberg)
The Role of HR Professionals in Wage-Setting and Worker-Firm Matching
Educational Choices and Expected Discrimination