Abstract: This paper studies how the design of debt restructuring programs shapes labor market outcomes. Using administrative data from Sweden and a novel examiner IV design, I find that participation reduces labor income and employment on average, with effects that persist after the program ends. These average effects mask substantial heterogeneity. This heterogeneity reflects differential exposure to upward repayment adjustments, which discourage unemployed participants from seeking work. I use a calibrated labor supply model to show that modest changes in program structure can improve welfare for both debtors and creditors. These findings challenge the practice of substantially adjusting repayment plans in response to income changes.

Abstract: We study the effects of corporate acquisitions on workers using Swedish administrative data and document substantial, persistent earnings losses following acquisitions. These losses reflect both displacement and wage cuts among stayers from target firms. We find no evidence that increased monopsony power accounts for these wage cuts. Instead, they are concentrated in acquisitions where the acquiring-firm CEO sat on the board of the target prior to the transaction. Such acquisitions increase acquiring-firm profits and CEO pay, without affecting total employment or revenue, consistent with rent redistribution. Overall, acquisitions reduce wages and disrupt employment, with profit gains partly extracted from workers.